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CSiURCH AND STATE-ExcuSING OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS FOR RrLIGIous
INSTRUCTION.-People ex rel. Latimer et al. v. Board of Education of City of
Chicago, 394 fI1. 228, 68 N. E. (2d) 305 (1946).-The separation of Church and
State, according to the precepts of the American form of constitutional govern-
ment, imposes no duty on the public school system to erect a barrier of hostility
and antagonism against religion or the churches. Accordingly, a regulation of the
Board of Education excusing the weekly absences of pupils for the purpose of
receiving religious instruction does not, it was held in this case, do violence to
the compulsory attendance law and is a reasonable rule for the practical ad-
ministration of the public schools.
Petitioners sued for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the Board of
Education to revoke the authority it previously gave to the superintendent of
schools to excuse public school children at the request of their parents for one
hour each week before the end of the regular school period, for the purpose of
attending religious educational classes at places outside of the school activities
or property. The petitioners also sought to compel the Board to make and en-
force rules prohibiting the excusing of pupils from the public schools to attend
classes for instruction in religion, or in aid of any church or sectarian purpose.
The interest alleged by the petitioners in bringing this suit was that they, as
citizens and residents of the city of Chicago, were particularly interested in the
enforcement of laws relating to civil rights and liberties. They stated that they
had frequently engaged in activities opposing union of Church and State in the
public schools.
It was alleged that pursuant to the 1929 regulation the respondent through
its superintendent, teachers and other assistants, had for sixteen years released
pupils from school during regular school sessions for one hour per week on condi-
tion that they attend a class in religious instruction and thereafter return to their
public school classrooms.
The petitioners asserted that at the present time 22,500 pupils out of 249,614
children attending elementary public schools were excused for one hour per week,
usually the last hour of the school day on Wednesday. The petitioners further
alleged that the superintendent and principals were required to issue directions
concerning the dismissal of pupils for the purpose outlined and the superintendent
used postage, stenographic service, stationery, telephones and office space for such
service; that the principals of the schools engaged in conferences with the teachers
of religion and with the agents of the churches concerning the details of the plan;
that such services constituted duties performed in the course of their employment
for which they were paid from the public school fund.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the action of the respondent pur-
suant to the regulation violated the American principle of separation of Church
and State. Particularly, they said it was a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
It was also alleged that such action violated sections of the Illinois constitution
which required the General Assembly to provide a thorough and efficient system
of free schools and that no public corporation should make any appropriation
or pay from any public fund whatever anything in aid of any church or sec-
tarian purpose.
In further support of their contention petitioners relied on other provisions of
the Illinois constitution, which state in part: ". . . nor shall any preference be
given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship."
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The petition disclosed that a large number of the pupils were receiving Catho-
lic religious instruction at 137 parochial schools and a smaller number of pupils
were receiving instruction in Protestant religions at 57 different Protestant church
buildings.
The Supreme Court of Illinois -upheld the position of the Board of Education,
stating that the petitioners did not show any violation of the Federal and State
constitutions, or of the statutes of the State of Illinois, nor did they show any
violation of such clear legal rights in themselves or neglect of such clear legal
duty on the part of the respondent Board, as would be essential for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus.
The court, in the opinion written by Justice Fulton, conceded that the Board
of Education should not help sustain or support any school controlled by a church
or sectarian denomination or aid any church or sectarian purpose. It was not
to follow from this principle, however, that a school board should be hostile or
antagonistic to religion or churches, nor should the board interfere with the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious freedom.
The preamble to the constitution adopted in Illinois in 1870 recognizes the
reliance of the people upon a Deity, and while the decisions of the federal and
state courts approve the doctrine, of the separation of Church and State, it is
nowhere stated that there is any conflict between religion and the State, nor any
discrimination of any kind against religion as such. In view of the basic religious
philosophy of our government, it would be incongruous, in this case, to exhibit
a spirit of hostility and antagonism toward religion as the petitioners would have
this court do.
The court cited Reichwald v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 258 Ill. 44, 10 N. E.
266 (1913), which 'held, "The Constitution does not absolutely prohibit the exercise
of religion, but, on the contrary, provides that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall be forever guar-
anteed. . . . No one can be obliged to attend or contribute; but no one has a
right to insist that the services shall not be held. The man of no religion has
a right to act in accordance with his lack of religion, but no right to insist that
others shall have no religion." (Italics ours)
Petitioners cited with favor People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245
111. 334, 92 N. E. 251 (1910) in which case the teachers employed by the schools
during school hours and in the schoolroom read to the pupils portions of the King
James version of the Bible; sacred hymns were sung in concert by the pupils; the
Lord's prayer was recited in unison. There, as here, the petitioners filed a writ of
mandamus to require the defendant in error to discontinue these exercises in the
public schools. The court held that such exercises constituted acts of worship; that
the pu lls were all required to participate; that the versions used were of a dis-
tinctly denominational tinge and a different interpretation from that taught by other
religious faiths. The King James version was, in fact, a sectarian text to which
Catholic, Jewish and some Protestant parents objected. Thus it was held a viola-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against the use of school funds in aid of
a sectarian purpose.
The court in the instant case pointed out that the present petitioners made no
charge that the action of the Board here was discriminatory or that any par-
ticular denomination or religious faith was favored, or that any part of the re-
ligious instruction was held in the schoolroom on school property.
Persuasive authority for the holding is the New York case of People ex rel.
Lewis v. Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663 (1927), which had occasion to re-
view a very similar mandamus case in which it held that the school authorities
might release pupils during school hours for the purpose of attending religious
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education classes in their own churches without violating constitutional provisions
very similar to those of Illinois.
In the New York case, as here, the petitioners alleged the use of public money
to aid the church schools because of the time the public school teachers used in
arranging, registering and checking excuses. There, too, it was held that this was
in no way, a constitutional violation. Both courts agree that the regulation
permitting class absences for the purpose of receiving religious instruction does
not do violence to the compulsory attendance law but rather is a reasonable
rule for the practical administration of the public schools.
Thomas Broden.
SLOT MACHINES AND GAMING DEVICES AS PROPERTY AND TAxABLE.-In re
Weisenberg's Estate ...... Ohio ......, 70 N. E. (2d) 269 (1946).-This was an action
brought by the executor in the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County for the re-
covery of certain gaming devices confiscated by the chief of police, which were
alleged to be part of the decedent's estate. The decedent, during his life and at
the time of his death, possessed and maintained ownership over 66 mechanical
slot machines and 27 mechanical golf track amusement devices. Following the
decedent's death and prior to the appointment of the executor, the coroner of
Cuyahoga County, while duly carrying out the duties of his office and making an
investigation of the decedent's death, discovered the slot machines and the me-
chanical golf devices on the premises and immediately reported their location
to the police department with recommendations that they be seized. At the time
the property was seized by the police department it was not in use nor was it
displayed for gambling.
The Probate Court rendered a judgment for the executor and ordered the chief
of police to return the property in question to the executor of the estate. The
chief of police appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and
issued final judgment in favor of the chief of police. The executor raised a mo-
tion for a certification of the record by the Supreme Court, and the motion was
granted, and this court affirmed the judgment of the Probate Court.
On appeal, the question was this; what factors determine whether property
of this nature will remain part of the decedent's estate or be subject to con-
fiscation by the law authorities? Incidental to the question at hand but not
lacking in importance, is whether such property is taxable property.
The language of the code applicable to the question is contained in Section
13066, General Code: "Whoever keeps or exhibits for gain or to win or gain
money or other property, a gambling table, or faro bank, or keno bank, or a
gambling device or machine, or keeps or exhibits a billard table for the purpose
of gambling or allows it to be so used, shall be fined not less than fifty dollars
nor more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned not less than ten days nor
more than ninety days, and shall give security in the sum of five hundred dollars
for his good behavior for one year."
It is well settled in the state of Ohio that property of this type may not be
used for gaming or exhibited for public gambling, but the provisions set out in
Section 13066 of the General Code do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
lawful possession. It is the contention of the executor that, because such property
at the time of the decedent's death or during his life was not in the decedent's
possession for unlawful gambling, and was not displayed for the gambling whim
of the public, it was in custodia legis and that upon his death it vested along with
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all other property in the executor, as decided by the Probate Court. The chief
of police based his claim on the theory that the devices are prima facie illegal
regardless of whether they are operated for gain or merely in storage on the
decedent's premises, and maintained that they were unlawful property subject to
seizure and confiscation.
If what the chief of police set forth in his claim were the law in the state of
Ohio, there would seem to be no property. in devices of this type notwithstanding
their absence from illegal display or disposition. In this event it would be quite
possible for confiscation to take place while devices of this nature were under
construction or under consignment to an agent, and certainly the authorities of
the law would be justified in seizing any gambling equipment in the possession
of an innocent purchaser if these claims were valid. But the court upheld the
executor's contention that the devices were not illegal and subject to seizure merely
because of their nature, the true test being that of disposition and use. Therefore
the machines might be manufactured and stored in the state of Ohio, if only for
sale or resale within a jurisdiction where they are not outlawed by statute.
In support of its decision the court cited, 24 American Jurisprudence 437,
Section 57, "A slot machine - is not per se a gambling device, since it may be
used or played upon for an innocent purpose, and the courts cannot, therefore,
take judicial notice that every slot machine is a gambling device."
Throughout this country there seems to be a conflict on this issue. In the final
analysis it is the language of the statute that determines whether or not mere
possession of certain gambling devices will be contrary to law and whether or
not evidence must be shown as to the purpose of their display or disposition.
The court, in a brief opinion, recalled the precedent set forth in previous
decisions with respect to taxation and held that such gambling devices, even
when possessed illegally, were to be considered by the tax commission as taxables.
"Slot machines, placed by owner in private clubs, kept in repair by his service-
men, opened by them from time to time to remove money therefrom and divide
it with clubs, transferred from one locality to another, returned to owner for re-
pairs, and listed on his federal tax return, were 'tangible things being the subject
of ownership' within statute defining personal property subject to taxation."
Ellery v. Evatt, Tax Com'r., 140 Ohio St. 249442 N. E. (2d) 979 (1942).
It would seem to follow that if the law of taxation will offer no protection
to individuals who are holding in possession property of an illegal nature, that
the internal revenue law would show the same tendency toward those who receive
gains from transactions that are branded illegal. In the case of United States v.
Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 71 L. Ed. 1037, *47 S. Ct. 607 (1927), it was held that
income derived from transactions in violation of the law were subject to income
tax. Illegal gains were held to include income from such illegal transactions as
card playing, race track bookmaking, traffic in liquor, unlawful insurance policies,
lotteries, graft, embezzlement, fraud, misapplied money of a client by an attorney,
protection payments, and ransom money.
Robert A. Tarver.

